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Abstract: In this paper, the set of all physical theories is represented by
a countable collection of consequence operators {SVNj | j ∈ IN} defined
on a language Λ. It is established that in the Grundlegend Structure,
a nonstandard structure, there exists an injection S such that for any
significant natural-system representation W ⊂ Λ, SW is an ultralogic
such that
⋃
{SVNj (W) | j ∈ IN} = SW(
∗W) ∩Λ.
1. Introduction.
Seventy years ago, Tarski (1956, pp. 60-109) introduced the mathematical
object called a consequence operator as a model for various aspects of deductive
thought. There are two such mathematical theories investigated, the general and the
finite consequence operators (Herrmann, 1987). The finite consequence operators
are usually the operators that model human thought processes that use but finite
arguments and a finite collection of premises to arrive at a specific conclusion. Let
L be a nonempty language, P be the power set operator and F the finite power set
operator.
Definition 1.1. A mapping C:P(L)→ P(L) is a general consequence operator
(or closure operator) if for each X, Y ∈ P(L)
(i) X ⊂ C(X) = C(C(X)) ⊂ L; and if
(ii) X ⊂ Y, then C(X) ⊂ C(Y).
A consequence operator C defined on L is said to be finite (finitary, or algebraic) if
it satisfies
(iii) C(X) =
⋃
{C(A) | A ∈ F(X)}.
Remark 1.2. The above axioms (i), (ii), (iii) are not independent. Indeed,
(i), (iii) imply (ii). Hence, the finite consequence operators defined on a specific
language form a subset of the general operators.
Natural-systems are named and defined by scientific disciplines. Each is an
arrangement of named physical objects that are so related or connected as to form
an identifiable unity. Except for the most basic, natural-systems always require the
existence of accepted natural laws or processes for, at least, two events to occur.
It is required that a natural-system either be constructed by application of natural
laws or processes from more fundamental physical objects (natural-systems); or that
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the natural-system is altered in its development by such natural laws or processes,
in which case the original natural-system may be considered as a more fundamental
physical object.
Explicit statements for a natural law or process and the theories they yield
are human inventions that imitate, in the words of Ferris (1979, p. 152), intrinsic
natural laws or processes that govern the workings of those portions of our universe
that are comprehensible. Individuals apply various mental processes to a set of
hypotheses that include a set of natural laws or processes and predict behavior for
a natural-system. Mental processes are also applied to natural laws or processes
in order to construct our material “man made universe.” Consequence operators
model such mental behavior. Indeed, these operators model many general mental
processes not merely the standard notion termed as “deduction.”
2. Axiomatic consequence operators.
Prior to simplification, we need to assume that our consequence operators are
axiomatic, where the axioms include appropriate natural laws or processes. Also,
we need the fundamental philosophy of modern science that, with the exception of
the accepted and most fundamental of physical objects, all named natural-systems
are obtained by application of natural laws or processes to physical objects that
are defined as more fundamental in character than the natural-systems of which
they are constituents. Obviously, specified natural laws or processes alter specific
natural-system behavior. As mentioned, the results in this paper are not restricted
to what is usually termed as deduction. As done in Herrmann (1999, p. 12), we
only consider equivalent representatives as the members of L. (This is not the same
notion as consequence operator logical equivalence.) Let C(L) [resp. Cf(L)] be the
set of all general [resp. finite] consequence operators defined on L, where A ⊂ L is
the set of logical axioms for F ∈ C(L) [resp. Cf(L)].
Although, usually, such consequence operators are considered as axiomatic, in
this application the use of axiomless operators (Herrmann 1987, p. 3) leads to a
significant simplification. For F ∈ C(L) [resp. Cf(L)], let A ∪ N ⊂ L and suppose
that F(∅) ⊃ A∪N. (Note: N does not denote the natural numbers). Then, ∅ ⊂ A∪N
yields F(∅) ⊂ F(A ∪N), and A ∪ N ⊂ F(∅) yields that F(A ∪ N) ⊂ F(F(∅)) = F(∅).
Hence, F(∅) = F(A∪N). Further, note that if B ⊂ A∪N, then since ∅ ⊂ B, it follows
that F(∅) = F(A∪N) ⊂ F(B) ⊂ F(F(A∪N)) = F(A∪N) and F(B) = F(A∪N). The
objects in F(A ∪ N) behave as if they are axioms for F. Can we use this axiomatic
behavior to generate formally a specific consequence operator C, where C(∅) = ∅ and
the only results displayed by this model are conclusions not members of F(A∪N)?
If such a meaningful consequence operator exists, then this approach is acceptable
since if natural laws or processes, as represented by N, are stated correctly, such as
always including any physical circumstances that might restrict their application,
then they behave like physical “tautologies” for our universe. For such a basic
consequence operator F, the set F(∅) is composed of all of the restatements of N
that are considered as “logically” equivalent, and all of the pure “logical” theorems.
In general, various forms of scientific argument are modeled by consequence
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operators, where the use of axioms is a general process not dependent upon the
axioms used. The axioms are but inserted into an argument after which the actual
rules of inference are applied that might yield some x ∈ L− F(∅). It is this x that
may yield something not trivial. In the physical case, this x may represent some
aspect of an actual physical object distinct from the natural laws or processes.
3. Rules that generate consequence operators.
In this investigation, the term “deduction” is broadly defined. Informally, the
pre-axioms A ∪N is a subset of our language L, where N represent natural laws or
processes, and there exists a fixed finite set RI = {R1, . . . ,Rp} of n-ary relations
(n ≥ 1) on L. The term “fixed” means that no member of RI is altered by any set X
of hypotheses that are used as discussed below. It is possible, however, that some of
these Ri are N dependent. It can be effectively decided when an x ∈ L is a member
of A ∪ N or a member of any of the fixed 1-ary relations. Further, for any finite
B ⊂ L and an (j+1)-ary Ri ∈ RI, j > 1 and any f ∈ Ri, it is always assumed that it
can be effectively decided whether the k-th coordinate value f(k) ∈ B, k = 1, . . . , j.
It is always assumed that a mental or equivalent activity called deduction from a
set of hypotheses can be represented by a finite (partial) sequence of numbered (in
order) steps b1, . . . , bm with the final step bm the conclusion of the deduction. All
of these steps are considered as represented by objects from the language L. Any
such representation is composed either of the zero step, indicating that there are
no steps in the representation, or one or more steps with the last numbered step
being some m > 0. In this inductive step-by-step construction, a basic rule used
to construct this representation is the insertion rule. If the construction is at the
step number m ≥ 0, then the insertion rule, I, is the “insertion of an hypothesis
from X ⊂ L, or insertion of a member from the set A ∪ N, or the insertion of any
member of any 1-ary relation, and denoting this insertion by the next step number.”
If the construction is at the step number m > 0, then the rules of inference, RI,
are used to allow for an insertion of a member from L as a step number m + 1,
in the following manner. For any (j + 1)-ary Ri ∈ RI, 1 ≤ j, and any f ∈ Ri, if
f(k) ∈ {b1, . . . , bm}, k = 1, . . . , j, then f(j+1) can be inserted as a step number m+1.
Note, in particular, how specific “choices” are an essential part of the process here
termed as deduction. The deduction is constructed only from the rule of insertion
or the rules of inference as here described.
It is not difficult to show that if you apply these procedures to obtain the final
step as your deduction, then these procedures are modeled by a finite consequence
operator. For the language L, a set of pre-axioms A ∪ N, a set RI and any X ⊂ L,
define the set map CN, by letting CN(X) be the set of all members of L that
can be obtained from X by “deduction.” Clearly, by insertion X ⊂ CN(X). Since
CN(X) ⊂ L, then we need to consider the result CN(CN(X)). Since no member of
the set RI is altered by introducing a different set of hypotheses such as CN(X),
then this composition is defined. Let x ∈ CN(CN(X)). By definition, x is the final
step in a finite list {bi} of members from L. The steps in this finite “deduction”
from which x ∈ L is obtained are the I steps, where we only added to this insertion
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members of CN(X), and the RI steps, as defined above, where the RI are fixed.
Suppose that bi ∈ CN(X) is any of these additional insertions. Simply construct a
new finite sequence of steps by substituting for each such bi the finite sequence of
steps from which bi is the final step in deducing that bi ∈ CN(X). The resulting
finite collections of steps are then renumbered. The final step in this new finite
deduction is x. Since the reasons for all of the steps is either the original I or RI,
and RI contains predetermined n-ary relations that are not dependent upon any
deduction, then the finite sequence obtained in this manner is a deduction for a
member of CN(X). Hence, x ∈ CN(X). Consequently, CN(CN(X)) = CN(X). The
finite requirement is obvious since there are only a finite number of steps in any
deduction. Note that CN(∅) ⊃ B, where B is the set of all x ∈ L such that x is a step
obtained only by the rule I. Throughout the remainder of this paper, it is assumed
that all “deductions” follow these procedures and the corresponding consequence
operator is defined as in this paragraph.
4. Intrinsic natural laws or processes.
For “scientific deduction” for a fixed science-community, i, we need to consider
as our rules of inference a collection Ri = RI of all of the “rules of inference
used by this specific scientific-community and allowed by their scientific method”
as they are applied to a specified language Σi, the language for “their science.” At
present, this definition for Ri is rather vague. Hence, the existence of such a set
Ri, the rules of inference for a science-community, is an assumption. Of course, as
Σi changes, so might the Ri be altered. The Ri can also change for other valid
reasons. From this a specific “science” consequence operator SNi is generated for
each set of pre-axioms Ai ∪ Ni, where Ai are the basic logical axioms and Ni the
natural laws or processes. For proper application, the science consequence operator
is applied to specific natural-systems, not those generally described. Thus SNi has
physical meaning only when SNi is applied to an X where every member of X and
SNi(X) is a “tagged” statement that identifies a specific natural-system (Herrmann,
1999). In all that follows, we are working in a particular Ui ⊂ Σi of natural laws
or processes that are accepted by a particular science-community at this particular
moment of time and that are stated using the language Σi.
The axiomatic consequence operator SNi :P(Σi)→ P(Σi), where SNi(∅) ⊃ (Ai∪
Ni), can be reduced, formally, to an axiomless consequence operator on the language
Σi − SNi(Ai ∪ Ni) as shown by Tarski (1930, p. 67). Let V = {Ai,Ni.} For each
X ⊂ Σi − SNi(Ai ∪Ni), let S
V
Ni
(X) = (Σi − SNi(Ai ∪Ni)) ∩ SNi(X). For this SNi , the
operator SVNi is a consequence operator on Σi − SNi(Ai ∪ Ni) and has the property
that SVNi(∅) = ∅. Thus using SNi(Ai ∪ Ni) as a set of axioms, logical and physical,
SVNi behaves as if it is axiomless, where the explicit natural laws or processes Ni
behave as if they are implicit. Since, in general, SNi(Ai ∪ Ni) ⊂ SNi(X), the only
consequences that are not but specific deductions from the pre-axioms Ai ∪ Ni are
members of SNi(X) − SNi(Ai ∪ Ni), where the explicit X should not include the
axioms SNi(Ai ∪ Ni). Physically, S
V
Ni
is the exact operator that, using implicitly
such axioms as SNi(Ai ∪ Ni), characterizes the coalescing of a given fundamental
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collection of named and tagged objects in X and that creates a different natural-
system or that alters natural-system behavior. The use of axiomless consequence
operators is a definite and useful simplification.
Applying the above to an entire family of science-communities, we have for
an arbitrary science-community, i, a nonempty sequentially represented collection
Vi = {Ai, {Nij | j ∈ IN}} such that for any Nij ∈ Vi, the set map S
Vi
Nij
defined for
each X ⊂ (Σi − (
⋃
{SNij(Ai ∪ Nj) | j ∈ IN})) = Λi by S
Vi
Nij
(X) = Λi ∩ SNij(X) is a
consequence operator defined on Λi. (The set IN is the natural numbers not including
0.) The family Vi may or may not be finite. In many cases, it is denumerably since
to apply SViNij to a specifically tagged description X certain parameters within the
appropriate set of natural laws or processes must be specified so as to correspond to
the specific X. We assume that the applicable set of natural laws or process {Nij}
is the range of a sequence. This will not affect the conclusions since this yields
that Vi can be finite or denumerable. Note that for some of the Nnm and some
tagged X ⊂ Λi to which the Nnm either does not apply or does not alter, we would
have that SVnNnm(X) = X. For logical consistency, it is significant if there exists some
type of unifying consequence operator that will unify the separate theories not only
applied by a specific science-community (i), but within all of science.
5. An ultralogic unification for all physical theories.
Although all that follows can be applied to arbitrary science-communities, for
notational convenience, consider but one science-community. Thus assume that we
have one language for science Σ and one sequentially represented countable family
of natural laws or processes and logical axioms Aj ∪ Nj as well as one family of
sequentially represented rules of inference Rj that generate each specific theory. It
is, of course, assumed that “science,” in general, is a rational and logically consistent
discipline. Let sequentially represented V = {Aj ∪ Nj | j ∈ IN}. This yields the
sequentially represented countable set of all physical theories {SNi | j ∈ IN} and
the countable set {SVNj | j ∈ IN} of intrinsic sequentially represented consequence
operators defined on Σ − (
⋃
{SNj(Aj ∪ Nj) | j ∈ IN}) = Λ. The following theorem
and corollary do not depend upon each member of {SNj | j ∈ IN} being declared as
a “correct” physical theory.
Our interest is in the non-trivial application of, at the least, one of these theories
to members of P(Λ).
Definition 5.1. A nonempty X ⊂ Λ is called a significant member of P(Λ) if
there exists some i ∈ IN such that X 6= SVNi(X).
In what follows, we consider all of the previously defined notions but only with
respect to this informal V and the language Λ. Now embed all of these informal
results into the formal superstructure M = 〈N ,∈,=〉 as done in Herrmann (1987,
p. 5; 1993, pp. 9-11). Further, consider the structure ∗M = 〈 ∗N ,∈,=〉 a
nonstandard and elementary extension of M that is a 2|M|-saturated enlargement
(| · | denotes cardinality). Finally, consider the superstructure Y , the Grundle-
gend Structure (Herrmann, 1993, pp. 22-24). We note that such a structure based
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upon the natural numbers appears adequate for our analysis since this investiga-
tion is only concerned with members of a denumerable language. However, if one
wishes to include additional analysis, say with respect to the real numbers, then
the Extended Grundlegend Structure (Herrmann, 1993, p. 70) can be utilized. The
approach seems at first to be rather obvious. Simply consider an W ⊂ Λ. Then
the result
⋃
{SVNj(W) | j ∈ IN} is most certainly a unification for all of the physical
science theories where each theory is represented by a SNj . However, in general,
this union process does not yield a consequence operator (Herrmann, 1987, p. 4).
Thus, although each theory may acceptably predict natural-system behavior, such
a combined theory may not lend itself to a unification that can be “rationally”
presented. Consequently, what is sought is a unification that generates each of the
results SNj(W) and this generation is by means of a consequence operator styled
process.
Theorem 5.1. Given the language Λ, and the sequentially represented set of
consequence operators {SVNj | j ∈ IN}. Then there exists an injection S on the set
M of all significant subsets of Λ into ∗(Cf (Λ)) such that for each W ∈ M, SW
is a nonstandard consequence operator, an ultralogic, such that
⋃
{SVNj (W) | j ∈
IN} ⊂
⋃
{ ∗SVNj (
∗W) | j ∈ IN} =
⋃
{ ∗(SVNj (W)) | j ∈ IN} ⊂ SW(
∗W) and
⋃
{SVNj (W) | j ∈ IN} = SW(
∗W) ∩Λ.
Proof. In Herrmann (1987, p. 4), a very special set of consequence operators is
defined and shown to be closed under the union operator. For this application and
for a given X ∈ M, the set is HX = {C(Y,X) | Y ⊂ Λ}. Each of the consequence
operators in HX is defined as follows: for each Z ⊂ Λ, C(Y,X)(Z) = Z∪Y, if Z∩X 6=
∅; and C(Y,X)(Z) = Z otherwise. The set HX is closed under the union operator in
the following sense. Consider {C(Y1,X), . . . ,C(Yn,X)}, n > 1; Yk ⊂ Λ, 1 ≤ k ≤ n.
Then C(Y1 ∪ · · · ∪Yn,X)(Z) =
⋃
{C(Y1,X)(Z), . . . ,C(Yn,X)(Z)} = F(Z), F ∈ HX.
Consider the entire set of intrinsic consequence operators {SVNj | j ∈ IN}. Define
by induction, with respect to the sequentially represented {SVNi | j ∈ IN}, C1(Z) =
C(SVN1(X),X)(Z), C2(Z) = C(S
V
N1
(X) ∪ SVN2(X),X)(Z), . . . ,Cn(Z) = C(S
V
N1
(X) ∪
· · ·∪SVNn(X),X)(Z). From this definition, it follows that for any n ∈ IN the equation
(*) Cn(X) = S
V
N1
(X) ∪ · · · ∪ SVNn(X) holds for each X ⊂ Λ. All of the above is
now embedded into M and then considered as embedded into the superstructure
Y . Since {SVNi} is sequentially represented, there is a fixed sequence g such that
g(i) = SVNi , g[IN] = {S
V
Nj
| j ∈ IN} and g(i)(X) = SVNi(X). Hence for arbitrary
X ⊂ Λ, utilizing g, the above inductive definition yields a sequence fX: IN → HX
such that fX(j) = Cj and fX(j)(X) = Cj(X) and, as embedded into M, equation
(*) holds.
Let X ⊂ Λ. Then the following sentence holds in M.
∀x∀i((x ∈ Λ) ∧ (i ∈ IN)→ (x ∈ fX(i)(X)↔
∃j((j ∈ IN) ∧ (1 ≤ j ≤ i) ∧ (x ∈ g(j)(X))))) (1)
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By *-transfer, the sentence
∀x∀i((x ∈ ∗Λ) ∧ (i ∈ ∗IN)→ (x ∈ ∗(fX(i)(X))↔
∃j((j ∈ ∗IN) ∧ (1 ≤ j ≤ i) ∧ (x ∈ ∗(g(j)(X)))))) (2)
holds in ∗M. Due to our method of embedding and identification, sentence (2) can
be re-expressed as
∀x∀i((x ∈ ∗Λ) ∧ (i ∈ ∗IN)→ (x ∈ ∗fX(i)(
∗X)↔
∃j((j ∈ ∗IN) ∧ (1 ≤ j ≤ i) ∧ (x ∈ ∗g(j)( ∗X))))) (3)
Next consider ∗fX:
∗
IN→ ∗HX and any λ ∈ ∗IN−IN. Then internal ∗fX(λ) ∈ ∗HX
is a nonstandard consequence operator, an ultralogic, that satisfies statement (3).
Hence, arbitrary j ∈ IN and w ∈ ∗g(j)( ∗X) = ∗SVNj(
∗X) = ∗(SVNj(X)) ⊂
∗Λ imply
that w ∈ ∗fX(λ)( ∗X) since 1 ≤ j < λ. Observe that σ(SVNj(X)) ⊂
∗(SVNj(X)).
However, under our special method for embedding σ(SVNj(X)) = S
V
Nj
(X), for an
arbitrary X ⊂ Λ.
The final step is to vary the X ∈ M. We first show that for two distinct X, Y ∈
M there is an m ∈ IN such that CXm = C(S
V
N1
(X) ∪ · · · ∪ SVNm(X),X) 6= C
Y
m =
C(SVN1(Y) ∪ · · · ∪ S
V
Nm
(Y),Y). Since X, Y are nonempty, distinct and arbitrary, we
need only assume that there is some x ∈ X − Y. Hence there is some i ∈ IN and
j ∈ IN such that X ⊂ SVNi(X) 6= X and Y ⊂ S
V
Nj
(Y) 6= Y. Consider some m ∈ IN
such that i, j ≤ m. Then CXm({x}) = C(S
V
N1
(X)∪ · · · ∪ SVNm(X),X)({x}) = S
V
N1
(X)∪
· · · ∪ SVNm(X) 6= X ⊂ C
X
m({x}). But C
Y
m({x}) = C(S
V
N1
(Y)∪ · · · ∪ SVNm(Y),Y)({x}) =
{x} 6= CXm({x}) Thus C
Y
m({x}) 6= C
X
m({x}). Further, for any (†) k ∈ IN, m ≤
k, CYk ({x}) 6= C
X
k ({x}). Consider these results formally stated. Then by *-transfer,
for each distinct pair X, Y ∈ M there exists some m ∈ ∗IN such that ∗fX(m) 6=
∗fY(m). Thus for X, Y ∈ M, X 6= Y, A(X,Y) = {m | (m ∈ ∗IN) ∧ ∗fX(m) 6=
∗fY(m)} is nonempty. We use the Axiom of Choice for the general set theory
(Herrmann, 1993, p. 2) used to construct our Y . Hence, there exists a set B, within
our structure, containing one and only member from each A(X,Y).
The internal binary relation {(x, y) | (x ∈ ∗IN) ∧ (y ∈ ∗IN) ∧ (x ≤ y)} is from
*-transfer of IN properties a concurrent relation with respect to the range ∗IN. Since
∗M is a 2|M|-saturated enlargement and |B| < 2|M|, there is some λ ∈ ∗IN such
that for each i ∈ B, i ≤ λ. Considering this λ as fixed, then by *-transfer of (†),
it follows that for any distinct X, Y ∈ M ∗fX(λ) 6=
∗fY(λ). Since M is injectively
mapped onto M, there exists an injection S on the set M such that each W ∈ M,
SW = ∗fW(λ) ∈ ∗(Cf (Λ)). Considering the general properties for such an ∗fW(λ)
as discussed above, it follows, that
⋃
{SVNj (W) | j ∈ IN} ⊂ SW(
∗W) ∩Λ.
Now assume that standard a ∈ SW( ∗W) −
⋃
{SVNj (W) | j ∈ IN}. (For our
identification and embedding, ∗a = a.) Then the following sentence
∀x∀i((x ∈ Λ) ∧ (i ∈ IN) ∧ x ∈ g(i)(W)→ x 6= a) (4)
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holds in M and, hence,
∀x∀i((x ∈ ∗Λ) ∧ (i ∈ ∗IN) ∧ x ∈ ∗g(i)( ∗W)→ x 6= a) (5)
holds in ∗M. But since a ∈ ∗fW(λ)( ∗W), then statement (5) contradicts statement
(3) and the proof is complete.
Corollary 5.1.1 If {SVNj | j ∈ IN} represents all of the physical theories that
describe natural world behavior, then the choice function and the last equation in
Theorem 5.1 correspond to an ultralogic unification for {SVNj | j ∈ IN}.
Note that usually W is a finite set. Assuming this case, then again due to our
method of embedding ∗W = W. In statement (3), ∗g(i) = ∗SVNi . However, S
V
Ni
has had removed all of the steps that usually yield an infinite collection of results
when SNi is applied to W. Thus, in most cases, SNi(W) is a finite set. Hence, if one
assumes these two finite cases, then we further have that SVNj(W) =
∗(SVNj(W)).
However, each SW remains a nonstandard ultralogic since each SW is defined on the
family of all internal subsets of ∗Λ since the consistency of the combined collection
of all of the scientific theories implies that Λ is denumerable. Of significance is
that corollary 5.1.1 is technically falsifiable. The most likely falsifying entity would
be the acceptance of a physical theory that does not use the rules of inference as
setout in section 3. In particular, when different hypotheses are considered, the
requirement that the rules of inference RI cannot be altered.
Such operators as SW can be interpreted in distinct ways. If they are inter-
preted in a physical-like sense, then they operator in a region called the nonstandard
physical world (Herrmann, 1989), where W corresponds physically to the natural-
system it describes. The restriction SW( ∗W) ∩Λ then represents a natural world
entity. As a second interpretation, S would represent an intrinsic process that ap-
pears to guide the development of our universe and tends to verify the Louis de
Broglie statement. “[T]he structure of the material universe has something in com-
mon with the laws that govern the workings of the human mind” (March, 1963, p.
143).
6. Probability models.
In Herrmann (1999, 2001), it is shown that given a specific probability theory
for a specific source or natural-system described by a single sentence {G} that
predicts that an event E will occur with probability p then there is an ultralogic
Pp that generates an exact sequence of such events the relative frequency of which
will converge to p. It is also shown that the patterns produced by the frequency
functions for statistical distributions that model natural-system behavior are also
the results of applications of ultralogics. Although the main results in these papers
state as part of the hypothesis that p is theory predicted, the results also hold if p or
the distribution is obtained from but empirical evidence. Theorem 2 in Herrmann
(1999, 2001) actually corresponds to Theorem 5.1. Notice that throughout Theorem
2 in Herrmann (1999,2001), the singleton set {G} can be replaced by any nonempty
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W ⊂ Λ, where the H is defined as in this paper, and not only does this Theorem 2
still hold but so do the results on distributions.
Are these results for probability models consistent with Theorem 5.1? If prob-
ability models predict natural-system behavior, in any manner, then, in general, the
natural laws or processes N that are assumed to lead to such behavior only include
a statement that claims that the event sequences or distributions appear in the
natural world to be “randomly” generated. It is precisely the results in Herrmann
(1999, 2001) that show that in the nonstandard physical world such behavior need
not be randomly obtained but can be specifically generated by ultralogics. These
results are thus consistent since the ultralogics obtained from Theorem 2 neither
correspond to nor apply to any nonstandard extension of the notion of standard
“randomness.”
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